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Abstract: In this work we will develop a new approach to solve the non repayment problem in 
microfinance due to the problem of asymmetric information. This approach is based on modeling 
and simulation of   ordinary differential systems where time remains a primordial component, 
they thus enable microfinance institutions to manage their risk portfolios by a prediction of 
numbers of solvent and insolvent borrowers ever a period, in order to define or redefine its 
development strategy, investment and management in an area, where the population is often poor 
and in need a mechanism of financial inclusion. 
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1. Introduction 
Microcredit is a major component of microfinance for the poor ($ 1.95 / person / 
day according to The World Bank 2017) a large part of this population does not 
have access to formal financial services, which almost excluded from the financial 
system, this is one of the main factors in the poor's inability to participate in the 
process of economic development of   regions where they live. The creation of 
microfinance industry, for over 30 years, aims to fight against poverty in improving 
the living conditions of the poor and allows them to integrate in the development of 
their region.  
 
The amounts awarded as part of microcredit, which is a component of the 
microfinance, they take the form of financing and refinancing of income-generating 
micro projects where borrowers, with entrepreneurial capabilities, choose a type of 
  
credit agreement, individual loan contract and joint liability loan. The first is 
characterized by an interest rate higher than the group lending. In a group lending  
each member is required to repay the total amount of its members if they fail 
otherwise they will all have access to an individual lending if all members of the 
group succeed each loan cycle. This mechanism of co-responsibility replaces the 
absence of material guarantees; it aims to create social interaction through 
monitoring and mutual pressure and mutual help   members. The problem of failure 
in the case of co-responsibility is that if at least one member fails this causes the 
failure of the entire group which prevents all members’ access to future loans 
among all the Microfinance Institutions MFIs. 
  
In the literature we find that the rate of reimbursement for group lending and the 
biggest individual loan carrying the risk of non-repayment in the collective case is 
due to the types of group members. A 'bad' borrower can negatively influence a 
'good' borrower and vice versa. (Kaicer, 2014)   
 
MFIs management requires a mastery of its portfolio borrowers in terms of 
performance and efficiency. The median return on equity for reporting institutions 
at the Mixmarket was 8.1% in 2016, against 7.9% in 2015 and 9.6% in 2014. The 
Non-Governmental Organizations NGOs in rural areas and banks argue that a 
positive change compared to the gross loan portfolio return aggregated to 26.5% in 
2016, quite similar to 2015. Africa has had a return of 34.3% that is the highest in 
the world, while South Asia had the lowest return of 22.8% during the year (Table 
1).  
Global level the global risk portfolio (GRP) exceeding 30 days was 4.7% in 2016, 
slightly higher to 3.9% in 2015. The South Asia GRP, which was the lowest in 
2015, increased to 1.9% in 2016, the largest change reported by MFIs. Africa MFIs 
have witnessed a deterioration in their portfolio as they recorded a PER of 6.9% in 
2016. 
 
 The portfolio at risk is associated with the risk of non-repayment, closely related to 
the numbers of solvent and insolvent borrowers, this risk presents Achill’s heel in 
microcredit and occupies a prominent place for better management of MFIs 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
 
This topic is also important for several academic researchers who proposed some 
approaches to diagnose and troubleshoot the risk of default. In terms of Modeling, 
risk is tackled by the application of approaches related to the exact sciences and the 
social sciences namely, game theory (Besley & Coate, 1995)   (Tassel, 1999) applied 
to the theory of contracts (Tassel, 1999) (Ghatak, 1999)such mechanisms to refine loan 
contracts in the presence of asymmetric information regardless of the type of contract and 
type of borrowers. 
 
  
The theory of incentive contracts (Maskin, 2011), (Bhole & Ogden, 2010) to 
minimize the effect of asymmetric information, like as optimization to minimize its 
effect of the asymmetry of information, optimized to maximize the welfare of the 
borrower under the budgetary constraints imposed by the MFI where it is proposed 
that the incentive take the form of refinancing the project in the event that the 
borrower fully or partially complies with the terms of his contract (Tedeschi, 2006). 
In addition to the aspect by data analysis (Kaicer, 2014)   (Bourjade & Schindele, 
2012)draw correlation structure by determining the characteristics of the solvent 
and borrowers who are insolvent. Adding predictive models to establish a credit 
scoring model. (Aboulaich, Khamlichi, & Kaicer, 2013).  Other works were interested 
in best practices of microfinance (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010) the authors have 
prescribed successful international microfinance actors where the utility is 
manifested in the welfare of borrowers and the portfolio quality of MFIs. To design 
managerial mechanisms to better manage the risk of non-repayment which include 
the work of (Norell, 2001), (Milgram, 2001), (Park & Ren, January 2001), (Hulme & 
Mosley, 1996). However, the number of academic work remains low relative to 
research in quantitative finance (Kaicer, 2014).  
 
The main idea of this paper is to propose a new approach to understand the 
manipulation of the risk of non-repayment and defend theoretically and practically 
for the minimization of the number of  unpaid, indeed if the rate of unpaid 
increases over time precisely in a daily way, weekly, monthly or yearly, this leads 
to a risky portfolio and so it threatens the sustainability of MFIs (Kaicer & 
Aboulaich, 2014)   The model illustrating this problem is a system of two non-linear 
differential equations. 
 
Since enough time Systems of differential equations play an important role for 
modeling, the description and monitoring of dynamic phenomena, It should be 
noted that non-linearity is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to generate 
chaos or randomness, which are both due to asymmetric information. The modern 
concept of deterministic chaos is increasingly used in scientific contexts varying 
mathematics and physical dynamic systems and even complex temporal variations 
of all types economics (Kaddar, Sahbani, & Allaoui, 2018)   , in chemistry, biology, 
physiology, sociology and even psychology. (Leiber, 1997) 
 
Like any organization, the MFI tries to ensure its sustainability by minimizing the 
number of unpaid also by expanding its activities in other areas in order to ensure a 
broad expansion of its services. The approach envisaged in our contribution is to 
understand the dynamic phenomenon of non-repayment in a borrowing population 
according to the solvency criterion, this would allow MFIs to predict in the 
medium term as well as in the long term the numbers of solvents borrowers and 
those who are insolvent, even as the existing mutual impact between good 
borrowers and bad, regardless of contracts type offered by the MFIs, to implement 
new agencies and to withdraw from others where risk portfolios occur. 
  
 The approach in this paper is a process of a dynamic system corresponding to the 
adapted financial system with the microfinance environment and the services 
offered by its institutions. In our study the process is powered by input are 
probability distributions and who contribute in the evolution of the system see all 
figures attached Again, there are disruptions that are unobservable magnitudes by 
the MFI and affect the process (figure 1). 
  
We will highlight the dynamics of the system, such as the evolution of borrowers 
according to their types Solvable / Insolvable, a system of differential equations 
noted 
general
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2. The model 
The proposed model addresses the dynamics of a borrower population where 
repayment of credits is a fundamental criterion for MFIs. In practice the mutual 
impact is strong between borrowers namely the socio-cultural environment and 
coexistence thus the influences are positive and negative in terms of compliance 
with the credit agreement. 
Either a zone Ƶ and let us consider a population of size P. Let α the proportion of a 
subpopulation Ƶ’ and who accepts the contracts offered by the MFI in Ƶ so 
P)1(   is still out of the microcredit system. In Ƶ' we assume the existence of the 
solvent borrowers of size P  and insolvable of P )1(  . Let 1  the proportion 
of insolvent that negatively influence solvent borrowers   then they will not respect 
their contract of refinancing. Let  2  the positive impact from the solvent to 
insolvent. P is practically composed by solvable that noted by S. and the insolvent 
by I. On the other hand, experience has shown that there is an exodus between the 
groups of solvent borrowers and insolvent in terms of credit cycles. This is 
modeled by two magnitudes (Kermack & McKendrick, 1927.): 
S1 (Respectively I2 ) the number of solvent (or insolvent) borrowers who have 
left the credit cycle. For a period credit cycle [0,t], the number of borrowers is a 
function of time noted by tS and tI : 
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In MFIs, the performance of the portfolios is to know the variation inter-temporal 
between tS  and tI   relative to the same period. This diagnosis can be modeled by a 
system of differential equations. The reformulation of assumptions leads us to the 
evolution model of the number of solvent and insolvent borrowers over time, by a 
system of nonlinear differential equations noted tSI )( . The following system 
determines under what  insolvency conditions is manifested or not in a population 
in period t: 












ttttttt
t
ttttttt
t
t
IISISIS
dt
dI
SISISIS
dt
dS
SI
221
121
)(
1
)1(
)(
1
)(








 
 
 
(3) 
 
Where 1  represents the transmission coefficient of the compartment of the 
solvable to the compartment of insolvable by the negative effect of contact with 
insolvent and 2  coefficient of transmission of the insolvency compartment to the 
credit by the positive effect of contact with solvable. Generally the weights can be 
seen as probability distributions, note that the model tSI )(  presents a simplification 
of the complex system of the microfinance environment. 
3. Numerical simulation and interpretations  
In this section, we propose numerical simulations of the system tSI )( . The results 
obtained give the evolution of     and     over time. Practically the parameters of 
the model are chosen in such a way as to summarize the missing information, and 
characterizing the socio-economic, geographic and demographic environment of 
the target area fixed by the MFI. These parameters can be estimated empirically 
based on field surveys on or on the data base borrowers integrated in IT of the 
organization wishing to study the problem of non repayment. As for our numerical 
resolution we adopt values between 0 and 1 since they are proportions or 
parameters of the laws of probability. 
 
The test period is between 0 and 10 (x unit of time). For                
                       is with initial population                       A 
visualization of Figure 1 shows that, in the first of period,    decreases to 8000 
  
solvent borrowers then it becomes stable over the rest of the period. Quant à    also 
decreases and reaches almost zero values throughout the period. Generally the 
graph shows that there is a concordance between          . In this situation the MFI 
should diagnose the integration of individuals into microfinance systems in this 
area. Here, we are talking about financial inclusion and even the mutual influence 
between safe borrowers and risk borrowers               . 
 
  
In figure 2, for                                      with a strong 
migration to the microcredit system        , the simulation of         generates 
an ideal situation for the MFI        . Indeed St evolves exponentially 
throughout the period relative to a remarkable degradation of    which reaches zero 
values from the beginning of the period.  
So the strategy of the MFI, for development and management, should maintain as 
much as possible the values taken by                  and which characterize 
this area where the MFI offered (or will offer) its services or financing contract. 
The MFI is thus must strengthen its existing in this area and expect even more 
borrowers being out of the microcredit system and encourage them to incorporate 
(figure 3). 
 
Othe important case for MFIs: on the period [0.10] with initial population from 
                                                           
   2=0.41, and     decreases towards a very small number of solvable, as for the 
number of insolvable, It will reach values close to 0 from the beginning of the 
period and will grow from half the period. In this situation the portfolios at risk 
become remarkable and thus the sustainability of the MFI is strongly threat. Given 
this undesirable situation MFI should review its development strategy and 
management where he could withdraw from this area possibly characterized by the 
parameters                                                     
(figure 3) 
  
In figure 4, we have as initial population                     and  
                                             . This situation 
remains the worst case for all MFIs, since at the beginning of the period one 
visualizes a fall acute of           .    converges to 0 and remains virtually zero 
throughout the period. Furthermore    tends to 0 decreasing. Faced with this 
situation the MFI should absolutely react on the model parameter values to address 
this extreme fall. 
 
4.  Conclusion and Discussion: 
The work done so far in the field of microfinance is trying to model the risk of 
default by the different disciplines of social sciences. In this work we explored a 
new track of applied mathematics for non-repayment risk modeling in 
  
microfinance. The results found are not exhaustive and the present model reflects 
the dynamics of the microcredit system and describes the interactions between the 
MFI and its borrowers and on the other hand with the borrowers themselves. The 
risk of non-repayment is deeply caused by asymmetric information leading to the 
failure of microcredit contracts, which is a real challenge for MFIs. Our model 
developed in this paper presents a decision support tool for MFIs, regardless of 
type of contacts, which allows it to well redirect their development strategy to 
minimize the risk of unpaid, in terms of,1) create new local agency or withdraw 
other evaluating over time the number of solvent and insolvent borrowers ; 2) 
target populations that are not yet integrated into the microfinance system and 
strengthen financial inclusion and 3) provide a mechanism for sustainable 
development to people who need to improve their living conditions.  
To go further one can approach the analysis of the system to be able to understand 
and predict the behavior of the system and its performance as a function of the 
variation of the inputs of the model. Thus a control of the outlets that allows the 
MFI to mitigate risky portfolios and ensure its sustainability.  
The Proposed model enhancement may result in still eligible results by MFIs based 
on new work in the theory of systems of nonlinear differential equations by study 
of the stability of the system and the associated bifurcation. Calibration of the 
model requires a punctual estimate or by confidence interval, model parameters by 
empirical study in areas where the MFI would like to settle or create local agencies 
with borrowers. Our contribution presents one of those works whose approach is 
new and which would be a possible trail to explore for the future.  
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Appendix 
tant Note to the Author (cut this note after reading): For internet sources. It is necessary to list 
your date of access because web postings are often updated, and information available on one 
access. 
TABLE 1. STATISTICS OF MICROFINANCE ENVIRONMENT FROM  THE WORLD BANK 2016 
Areas Number of      
borrowers  
(Million) 
Annual 
 growth 
Share of rural 
borrowers 
Portfolio 
(Milliard USD) 
Number of MFIs 
MENA 2,4 3,2% 9% 1,4 30 
Eastern   
Europe and 
Central Asia 
3,1 -11,1% 67,7% 9,3 151 
LATIN 
AMERICA AND 
THE 
CARIBBEAN 
23,2 8,1% 39,8% 42,5 355 
AFRICA 7,2 -0,6% 70,8% 8,7 211 
SOUTH ASIA 78,3 23,5% 68,8% 23,5 222 
East Asia      
and Pacific 
17,8 9,2% 43,2% 16,5 148 
SOURCE: DATA FROM STATISTICAL DATA BANK, THE WB, 2019  
NOTE: SEE BAROMETRE OF MICORFINANCE (Perron, Micorfinance Barometer: 8th 
Edition, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. INFORMATION FLOW IN MICROFINANCE ENVIRONMENT AS AREA, 
PORTFOLIO. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. CONCORDANCE BETWEEN THE TWO NUMBERS OF INSOLVENT AND 
INSOLVENT BORROWERS 
  
 
 
Figure 3. SITUATION EXPECTED BY AN MFI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4. UNDESIRABLE SITUATION FOR MFI 
 
 
 
Figure 5. SITUATION WHERE THE MFI MUST CHANGE MANAGEMNT 
STRATEGY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 
 
 
 
 
 
